This article examines the impact of financialisation on the income shares of the top 1% from 1990-2010, through a panel analysis of 14 OECD countries. Drawing together literatures stressing the dependence of income inequality on the structural bargaining power of capital relative to labour, and of the dependence of accumulation on underlying institutionalised modes of state regulation, it shows that financialisation has significantly enhanced top income shares net of underlying controls. Whilst the income shares of the top 1% appear responsive to variables typical of wider studies of personal income inequality, we emphasise distinctive mechanisms of top income growth linked to the rising dominance of financial instruments and actors, facilitated by a historically specific regulatory order. These conditions were key to the emergence of a state of 'asymmetric bargaining' which disproportionately enhanced the fortunes of the wealthy. Results thus emphasise the importance of class-biased power resources and underlying regulatory structures, as determinants both of income concentration and of the distribution of economic rewards beyond growth capacity alone. _____________________________________________________________
Introduction
Financialisation has taken its place as a macro-stressor of income equality on a par with globalisation, technological change, and economic development. Kuznet's predictions of a secular return to equality following a disruptive phase of dualist economic growth have not come to pass (Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Piketty, 2014) , whilst globalisation has merely hastened a loosening of domestic constraints on firm activity, exposing labour to international wage competition and the threat of firm relocation (Choi, 2001; Harrison, 2005; O' Farrell, 2010) . Amid profound shifts in the global economic order since the 1980's, it is clear that a limited few have benefitted substantially, whilst many have seen their fortunes worsen -a situation brought into sharp relief by the socialisation of private debt in the post-crisis years, and the damaging impact of austerity on low income groups. Whilst some have stressed the dependence of inequality on capitalaugmenting technological growth and labour substitution (Zuleta, 2012) , others have pointed to institutional factors such as the strength of labour movements, leftist political power, and state welfare intensities (Beckfield, 2006 (Beckfield, , 2009 Daudey and Garcia-Lenalosa, 2007) . Backed by a strong and growing empirical knowledge base, the rise of finance has also been identified as a stressor of both personal income inequality, and of the division of national income between capital and labour (Kus, 2012; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013; Stockhammer, 2013; Volscho and Kelly, 2012) .
The landscape of inequality research has changed drastically on foot of the public exposure generated by Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014) , wherein he outlines a model of income inequality which positions wealth accumulation as an inherent, rather than aberrant feature of capitalist history. Piketty links this accumulation to a fundamental divergence, where slow growth relative to higher capital returns reduces the volume of investment needed to increase personal wealth stocks. Whilst this ratio has remained skewed toward capital returns throughout much of human history, it also appears likely to return to such a state if capital taxation remains lax, and post-crisis growth remains slow. In some instances the recurrent rise in top incomes has been sharp. In the United States, the share of income accruing to the top 1% of earners began to climb in the 1980's following a post-war slump, today bringing it to levels not seen since the close of the First World War (Volscho and Kelly, 2012, p. 679) . The implications of Piketty's framework for analyses of top incomes are profound. As the ratio of capital gains to growth, and ratio of capital to labour income both appear responsive to specific policy epochs, the social embeddedness and historical contingency of inequality is strongly asserted. Furthermore, as Piketty links the imbalance of capital-labour income and recent executive pay growth to the loosened bargaining constraints of top earners, it is useful to question what precisely has underpinned this inequality at the meso-level. This article argues that useful answers may be sought by focusing more clearly on asymmetries in power resources and the bargaining power of capital relative to labour, allied to a unique regulatory order which has underpinned top income growth since the 1980's. In doing so, it suggests that the historical specificity of these factors, and the mechanisms underpinning wealth accumulation since the 1990's, are usefully captured by the concept of financialisation.
Financialisation has been conceptualised in a variety of ways, such as the diversification of firms into financial activities away from core 'real economy' pursuits (Krippner, 2011) , the growing use of securitisation and tradable financial instruments as distributors of risk (Movitz and Allvin, 2014) , a realignment of corporate strategies in favour of profiteering and cost saving (Thompson, 2003; Thompson, 2013) , and the use of credit to shore up consumption under real wage stagnation (Guttman, 2008; Kus, 2013a; ILO, 2013; Stockhammer, 2012; van der Zwan, 2014) . In terms of class structure, the era of financialisation has been characterised by the rise of what Foster and Holleman (2010) term a 'financial power elite', deriving their wealth from financial profits, real estate, and executive compensation. Allied to such works on the general dynamics of finance-driven capitalism, a growing body of research has brought renewed attention to the structural powerlessness of labour relative to capital, and the institutionalisation of liberal regulatory order since the 1980's, factors strongly linked to greater accumulation at the top of the income distribution (Diwan, 2001; Guscina, 2006; Kristal, 2010) . The growing powerlessness of labour since the birth of the era of financialisation in the 1980's has been closely linked to the weakening of the labour movement under the combined pressures of service sector growth, labour market deregulation, and the loosening of capital restraints as an engine of post-Fordist economic growth (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003, Jayadev, 2007; Jessop 2001 Jessop , 2013 Tabb, 2010) . It thus appears that the fortunes of the 'winners' of finance-driven capitalism have clear social, political, and policy underpinnings.
Evidence for financialisation's specific impact on inequality continues to grow. Whilst financialisation is shown to exert a strong depressive effect on wage shares (Stockhammer, 2013) , Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2010) are emphatic on the role of politics in determining top income movement. This model of politically, rather than market determined income distribution accords with rent theory accounts of the financial sector's increasing share of national income.
Consequently, researchers in this vein note how market equilibria are politically structured, and that income advantage above market rates is often secured through political manipulation of regulatory structures (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2011, p. 541) . Beyond macro-level accounts of top income growth linked to growth and capital return rates, these accounts lend strong credence to a power resources explanation of top income capture.
The rise of top income shares is of immediate practical concern. Whilst Stockhammer has demonstrated the slowdown effect of financialisation on accumulation and investment (2004), Piketty's illustration of the long-run dynamics of capital relative to national income suggests that without political intervention to effect greater redistribution, inequality may undermine the very basis of democratic legitimacy (2014) . Tomaskovic-Devey et al (2014) estimate that financialisation has had an overall negative impact on non-financial sector output, where the resulting falloff in employment was borne by core labour, and where senior corporate officers netted gains from compensation packages linked to capital income. If the net effect of financialisation is merely to induce greater economic exposure to middle and low-income earners through debt incumbency and macroeconomic instability, an understanding of the factors driving this disproportionate capture of reward by top earners is therefore urgently needed.
This article examines the impact of financialisation on top incomes, based on existing research into the dynamics and drivers of income inequality. It draws on literatures identifying the asymmetric balance of bargaining power between capital and labour as a key determinant of the distribution of economic reward, and on research into the embeddedness of economic growth within 'social structures of accumulation' comprising historically-specific regulatory orders, modes of economic governance, and orientations to redistribution and social protection. With the exception of Dunhaput (2015) who focuses on a different set of financialisation and corporate governance related predictors, and Volscho and Kelly's (2012) and Hicks' (2014) studies of U.S. top incomes, this study is among the first to examine in a panel context, the impact of financialisation and financial regulation on the 1%. Using panel models of 14 OECD countries from 1990-2010, it argues that financialisation influences top incomes through two principal domains: (1) by altering the balance of bargaining power between capital and labour, and (2) through state regulatory controls and redistributive mechanisms. Interpreting these results within a regulation framework thus confronts certain limitations in Piketty's treatment of class relations and power asymmetries in his account of top income growth, whilst pointing toward specific policy domains through which institutional change may effect greater equality of outcome, beyond taxation alone.
Financialisation and income inequality
Why focus on top incomes specifically? Studies of inequality to date have largely taken the personal income distribution as their key outcome, and this has indeed fostered the construction of a useful body of theory which relates overall inequality to stressors such as globalisation, skillbiased wage premiums, and collective bargaining capacity. Whilst others have begun to open up the class politics of inequality by taking a closer look at the share of GDP accruing to labour and capital (Kristal 210, Stockhammer 2013) , they tend to obscure the internal composition of the 'capital' grouping somewhat, by relying on aggregate summaries of capital derived from national accounts. Isolating top earners from the personal distribution is thus particularly warranted in light of their interdependence with other components of the income distribution, where outcomes for one group may affect the other (Atkinson 2007 ). This is not merely a 'functional' relationship where the personal distribution responds mechanically to increases in upper fractiles, and the financialisation literature discussed below underscores the uniqueness of mechanisms of top income enhancement, as distinct from those which drive inequality across the distribution as a whole. In the context of financialisation, we thus find that substantial monetary gains tend to centre on resource-endowed individuals at the top of the distribution. Conversely, research on the impact of financial managerialism on working conditions reinforces this notion of interdependence between income groupings, by suggesting that the remaining 'resource-poor' have suffered with greater debt burdens, and poorer working conditions (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2011) .
The income composition of the 1% is also distinct from that of the wider income distribution, with greater shares of rentier and entrepreneurial income (Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2013) . The diversity of their income streams aside from earned income alone thus points to their coherence as a distinct 'class', a dimension often neglected in analytical work which has tended to focus on the 1% as merely another indicator of income inequality, rather than a distinct social group. There is a growing realisation however that top earners form not only a particular statistical fractile, but a distinct social group with unique mechanisms of reproduction (Roine and Waldenstrom 2010, p. 300) . Using individual and firm-level data for the U.S., Kim, Kogut and Yang (2015) have shown how high pay diffused among CEOs through status competition, facilitated by social networks and peer group influence. This important individual mechanism operated within a wider context of structural change such as the growing use of stock options for compensation and the reduction of top marginal tax rates, both of which feature strongly in the financialisation literature considered below. The 'functional interdependence' of this fractile grouping relative to the wider income distribution, and the mechanisms identified by Kim, Kogut and Yang (2015) suggest that financialisation may play a particular role in top income accumulation, in a manner qualitatively and quantitatively different from that of other ranges of the personal income distribution.
The political urgency of unpacking the drivers of this group is evident even within social democracies with historically high levels of resilience to inequality such as Finland, which have seen substantial increases in their personal income inequality (Gini) , driven strongly by rising top income shares (Jantti, Riihela, Sullstrom and Tuomala 2010) . There is also an important empirical issue concerning the omission of the 1% from studies of the personal income distribution. Given the substantial variance of the income shares of the 1% which account for up to 30% of the total income distribution, studies which exclude this (i.e. through underestimations of this groups associated with survey data), may offer a misleading account of the drivers of income inequality (Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2013) . The following section thus reviews the current state of knowledge surrounding the domains of financialisation-related income redistribution. It attempts to draw out mechanisms of association by linking various aspects of the general narrative of financialisation to the concentration of top incomes, whilst identifying relevant indicators.
Financialisation and worker's collective bargaining power
Close connections have been established between the rise of finance-driven capitalism and the falling share of GDP accruing to workers as pay (Stockhammer, 2009 (Stockhammer, , 2012 (Stockhammer, , 2013 . This imbalance in the 'factor' distribution of income between capital and labour, which has risen consistently across capitalist democracies since the 1980's (Kristal, 2010) , has allegedly created a disjuncture between economic performance and the spread of its financial rewards, which have disproportionately accrued to high earners (Atkinson, 2009) . The pace of this disjuncture has been especially strong in the financial sector, where top compensation has surged relative to other sectors (Kus, 2012) . Specific connections between financialisation and top income movement may thus initially be established in two ways. A more direct route suggests that profiteering in core financial sector activities disproportionately benefitted top earners by delinking pay from performance-related indicators, and through the provision of market-based compensation packages linked to stock options (Thompson, 2013) . A more abstract driver of top income growth may be identified in the growing literature on the relative bargaining power of capital and labour, and its role in income redistribution. Although typically treated separately, in reality these are two sides of the same coin, insofar as both are implicated not only in greater capture toward the top of the personal income curve, but in the consolidation of structural conditions reflecting a real shift in the capacity of institutions and actors to effect greater equality of outcome. Whilst the former is well represented in the financialisation literature, the latter requires some contextualisation in order to provide a clearer conceptual link to top income movement.
The period from the late 1970's to 2008 saw substantial growth in capital's share of GDP across the OECD, with a corresponding fall in labour's (Bentolia and Saint-Paul, 2003; Decreuse and Maarek, 2008; Ellis and Smith, 2007; Harrison, 2005; Kristal, 2010) . As globalisation and structural adjustment in the postwar era opened new markets for consumer goods, it also introduced wage competition as industrialising regions became attractive destinations for corporations seeking to cut their labour costs (Harrison, 2005) . The 1970's-1980 also saw an increasing penetration of labour-saving technology into the labour process, public spending retrenchment, extensive labour market deregulation, and capital account liberalisation under successive neoliberal governments. The result was a weakening of traditional labour protections, and the consolidation of policy regimes which would later underpin the growth of financial sectors within many capitalist democracies (Jayadev, 2007; Rueda and Pontusson, 2000) . Under the influence of such stressors, capacities for collective solidarity were weakened as deindustrialisation across the developed North eroded traditional bulwarks of unionism.
In tandem with this shift in capital's fortunes, how has financialisation particularly enabled the wealthiest to increase their income share on foot of labour's growing structural powerlessness? The hypothesised intermediary role of relative bargaining power is readily assimilable to the financialisation literature. Boyer was among the first to explore the distributional consequences of financialisation, providing a theoretical link between the rise of financial markets and shareholder power, and the dynamics of income distribution in the post-Fordist era (Boyer, 2000) . Accordingly, he identifies a 'reactive wage labour nexus' under finance-led growth, as a replacement for the comparatively stable social compacts of Fordism (Boyer, 2000, p. 117) . This dual weakening of labour's capacity to extract its stable factor share, coupled with a shift in bargaining power from labour to firm is consistent with Thompson's model of financialized corporate strategies 'disconnected' from human capital concerns (Thompson, 2003 (Thompson, , 2013 . Under this 'shareholder value' regime, financial incomes such as dividends, interest payouts, and capital gains have risen whilst financial globalisation has eroded workers share of economic rewards (Stockhammer, 2013) . Accordingly, CEO pay is now 262 times that of the average worker, with stock options comprising a sizeable proportion of compensation packages (Kus, 2012, p. 485) . The corresponding rise in the financial sector's share of profits, coupled with strong growth in rentier incomes linked to ownership of financial assets, thus suggests a profound upward transfer effect related to the rise of the financial sector (Epstein and Power, 2003; Volscho and Kelly, 2012) . Conversely for labour, as real wages remained stagnant during periods of finance-driven growth, falling wage shares stifled consumption demand, leading to the emergence in many developed countries of a debt-driven growth model where easy access to credit fuelled domestic demand (Stockhammer, 2012) . Capitalising on the same process which fuelled indebtedness, high earners leveraged greater returns by buying into securities, which together generated rising instability in the financial system, whilst decreasing the resilience of low-middle income earners to macroeconomic shocks (Guttman, 2008) .
Empirical evidence linking financialisation and inequality is substantial, and econometric analyses have already demonstrated the potential for higher capital shares of GDP to increase functional income inequality. When labour endowments are weak, higher capital shares appear to drive personal income inequality higher, and when labour's bargaining capacity is stronger (i.e. when labour's share of GDP increases), its effect on top quintile income is negative (Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa, 2007, p. 18) . Similarly, Stockhammer (2013) found strong evidence linking financialisation-related variables to an erosion of worker's share of GDP, results mirrored in Kus' (2012) analysis of its impact on post-tax Gini coefficients. On the basis of these observed connections between the factor and functional income distributions, it appears that the relative power resources of capital and labour may be central to understanding the rising capture of income by top earners. Furthermore, by omitting the mediating role of bargaining power (driven by strong financial sector performance since the 1990's), and its consequent erosion of worker's wage bargaining capacity, an important mechanism in the facilitation of top income capture may have been overlooked.
Financialisation as a social structure of accumulation
There is little doubt that the capital-labour dynamic associated with the era of neoliberal financialisation represents a distinct break from other historical epochs of capitalism (Jessop, 2013) . Locating the growth of top incomes within the realm of struggle between capital and labour over economic rewards in the labour market represents but one aspect of the politics of income distribution however. States and trans-national polities have equally underpinned this bargaining asymmetry through the policy measures and distributive mechanisms associated with deregulation and financial globalisation. In this sense, regulation theory offers a useful framework for thinking through both the systemic underpinnings of inequality as captured by the concept of relative bargaining power, as well as the unique institutional and policy frameworks associated with the era of financialisation. The assumption of the centrality of regulation forms the basis of the 'social structures of accumulation' school (SSA) which emphasises the role of states in capital accumulation through their maintenance of institutions of law and private property, systems of financial exchange and governance, and labour markets (McDonough, Reich, and Kotz, 2010) . The evolution of the various historical SSA's is typically treated sequentially. Following the demise of Atlantic Fordism with its emphasis on a demand-sustaining compromise between capital and labour, SSA theorists identified a successor in the form of a finance-based regime of accumulation, predicated on a dis-embedding of capital from regulatory constraints, and a commodification of the social wage through cheap credit (Tabb, 2010) .
Regulation thus provides a useful theoretical backdrop to the analysis of top income movement, as it deals with financialisation not only as a specific regulatory order, but as a logic of capitalism inherently disposed toward rising inequality (van der Zwan, 2014, p. 106) . While deregulation was instituted partly to address post oil-crisis stagflation, it instead ushered a shift from commercial to investment banking, and from loans to securities, disproportionately benefitting wealthy investors (Guttman and Plihon, 2008) . These shifts were underpinned by policy measures including the US Monetary Control Act of 1980, later Financial Services Modernisation Act of 1999 (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013) , and the European Second Banking Directive of 1989 (Guttman, 2008) .
The structures of this regime of finance-driven accumulation are well-articulated within the financialisation literature. The concept's insistence on real change in institutional structure is borne out by the disastrous impact of successive finance-driven crisis since the early 2000's, and recognition of the pervasive hand of the state in sustaining financial markets through taxation policy and regulation (van der Zwan, 2014). These new institutional and regulatory orders played a key role in facilitating top income capture, and the surge in capital gains and rentier income noted amongst industrialised countries throughout the 1990's was predicated on a number of regulatory shifts such as capital account openness, which increased capital mobility relative to labour since the 1990's, disproportionately raising capital returns (Epstein and Power, 2003; Jayadev, 2007) . Growth in profits attributable to financial intermediation and interest income in the OECD was driven by anti-inflationary monetary policies which raised real interest rates leading to greater capital gains, and deregulation of the financial sector which enabled domestic innovation in financial instruments as well as the incorporation of overseas markets for financial products (Epstein and Power, 2003, p. 234-235) .
While many countries have seen cuts or stagnation in their capital gains and top income taxation rates (GINI, 2011, p.93) , reliance on regressive redistribution measures such as indirect consumption tax often does little to alter the balance of income around the median (Beramendi and Rueda, 2007) . Piketty provides a compelling link between regulatory regimes and the politics of wage bargaining, suggesting that taxation played a key role in determining the capacity of top earners to leverage greater incomes. His analysis shows that top incomes correlate weakly with productivity, responding instead to lower marginal tax rates which encouraged executives to bid for higher compensation without the threat of losing their increases to the state (Piketty, 2014, p.508-512) . Furthermore, there is worrying evidence that the redistributive capacity of some welfare states (the percentage reduction in Gini from market to net income) is falling even amongst social democracies such as Denmark which has dropped from 50% in 1995, to 46% in 2010 (Solt, 2009 ). These observations suggest that top earners have not only managed to capitalise on the opportunities offered by deregulation, but to sidestep the absorption of their income by the redistributive mechanisms of the state.
Analyses have also shown how the impact of policy measures associated with financialisation on top incomes was specifically channelled through domestic institutional structures, through the capacity of the wealthy to affect policy. Volscho and Kelly (2012) found strong evidence for the impact of institutional factors on the pre-tax income share of the top 1% in the United States since the late 1940's. Their analysis noted an asymmetry in the power resources of categorical income groups, where top income growth was affected first through the capacity of organised labour to influence the market distribution of income, and secondly through the capacity of states to redistribute through taxation policy and social transfers. It is therefore difficult to attribute the growth of top incomes throughout this time to market forces alone given the clear political history of the loosening of institutional constraints on financial innovation. Drawing on a regulationist-informed view of financialisation thus provides us not only with a mechanism for linking regulatory politics to the material accumulation of specific interest groups, but with a ready source of indicators such as the spread of the tax burden between capital and labour, the capacity of the state to redistribute market income, and the scope of financial sector regulation.
Data and method
The following analysis uses fixed effects (within) OLS regression models which control for crossunit heterogeneity, on a strongly balanced panel of 14 OECD countries from 1990-2010. This specification is appropriate in the presence of between-group inequalities, and when subjectspecific confounding cannot be ruled out (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012) . Our analysis incorporates countries and variables which are likely to display cross-sectional and temporal dependence, given the close economic interrelationships likely to exist between countries and regional polities under trade and financial globalisation (Christophers, 2012) . Similarly, controls such as trade openness and economic growth are likely to be correlated amongst units with close trading dependencies, who may experience common patterns of exposure to economic shocks (i.e. the recent financial crisis). To account for these issues, we use Driscoll-Kraay standard errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and cross-sectional dependence (Hoechle, 2007, p. 285) .
Mindful of issues related to non-stationarity, appendix A reports panel unit root diagnostics, and an additional set of tables comparing coefficients with models estimated in first differences is available as an online supplement. Given the robustness of the FE estimator with comparatively small values of t (Woolridge 2013, p. 472) , and potential issues in a minority of specifications with missing values, the FE estimator is preferred. As a final robustness check, and to account both for temporal lags in the effect of independent variables on top incomes and the potential presence of endogenous predictors, we also include a full dynamic specification using the Arellano-Bond Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). These models include a lagged dependent variable, and all predictors are lagged by a period of one year. Across each of the three domains detailed below, variables are selected for inclusion in the GMM specification based on their substantive and statistical significance across previous models. Results in the dynamic specification are largely consistent with the fixed effects estimator.
The dependent variable is the share of income accruing to the top 1%, sourced from the World Top Incomes Database (WTID) (Alveredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2014) . These data offer the advantage of using tax records to estimate top income shares, mitigating issues of underestimation often associated with national surveys 1 . As the individual country series' adopt a common methodology, combining tax data-derived estimates of income with control totals for population and income, their cross country comparability is considerably enhanced (Atkinson and Sogaard 2013, p. 3) . The various top incomes series' also follow comparable 'gross income' concepts which are incomes prior to allowable deductions such as interest, depreciation, pension, and charitable contributions. They typically include income items such as salaries, wages, selfemployment income, business and farm income, dividends, rents, and interest; fractiles are then estimated against a control total often derived from adjusted national accounts totals of personal income. Capital gains are treated according to country tax code definitions. In come jurisdictions, realized capital gains are assessed under a separate system of returns, whilst in countries such as Australia and the U.K., certain gains are considered under regular income tax.
The exclusion of realized capital gains is generally preferred, as realisations of capital income are not typical 'flow' items but instead form a volatile component of income, with strong periodic variations dependent on stock prices. The U.S. offers a good illustration of this, as '…capital gains are typically very lumpy (they are realized once every few years), so that ranking tax returns by income level including capital gains leads to artificially overestimate very top income levels' (Piketty and Saez 2007, p. 195) . Furthermore, including realised capital gains risks erroneously assigning individuals to top fractiles who only occupy their position at the time of their asset sale (Roine and Waldenstrom 2010, p. 314) . Most calculations include 'rentier' items such as dividends, interest, farm income, and rents under their gross income definition however, with final income concepts typically comprising labour, capital (interest and dividends), and business income, less realized capital gains. The inclusion of these capital items thus allows us to align the dependent variable with the narrative of financialisation-related mechanisms of inequality growth. These measurement issues are discussed in detail in the country chapters in Piketty (2007, 2010) , and appendix B summarises measurement procedures for those countries discussed in these volumes. Finally, the reliability of pooling and the suitability of this series for modelling is further affirmed by the observation that this income series closely tracks other measures of personal income inequality such as the Gini/Atkinson coefficients and income percentile ratios. These observations suggest that factors often found to influence the bottom and mid-range of the income distribution may have similar effects at the top (Leigh 2007) , albeit through qualitatively different mechanisms as detailed above.
Inclusion of cases is determined by the availability of complete series from the world top incomes database offering an added benefit, as the tax-derived income series of developed nations are typically more reliable than those of developing nations (Leigh, 2007, p. 621) . Countries included in the following analysis are Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. Models are specified according to the two principal domains which we suggest mediate the impact of financialisation on top incomes. As detailed above, the substantive and conceptual scope of these domains includes the bargaining capacity of high earners relative to labour (power resources), and the embedding of financialisation in regulatory structures (social structures of accumulation). As both domains are embedded in bodies of formal theory with supporting econometric works, they offer not only a source of explanatory narrative, but specific control variables as elaborated below. Gross Operating Surplus on financial sector production activities as % of all sectors, from National Accounts data.
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Labour's share of Gross National Income
Compensation of employees + self-employed income (nominal compensation per employee * self-employed persons) as % of GDP. AMECO.
Financial globalisation (log)
Log of external assets and liabilities (sum of portfolio investment including equity and debt securities, foreign direct investment, debt instruments, financial derivatives and reserves) as % of GDP.
Lane and Milesi-ferretti (2007).
Economic growth (real GDP % yearly change) % annual change in real GDP. Penn World Table (Heston et al 2012) .
Capital taxation (% total tax burden) Levies on capital transfers or assets as % total tax burden AMECO.
Indirect taxation (% total tax burden) Taxes on goods and services as % total tax burden. AMECO.
Net income inequality (Gini) Standardised post-tax and transfer Gini income inequality, imputed from Luxembourg Income Study data. Solt (2009) .
Extent of banking sector liberalisation
6-point scale of presence/absence coded conditions: restrictions on opening of foreign banks, government permission of competition in domestic banking market, restrictions on branching, limits on bank activities (0=Fully Repressed, 5=Fully Liberalized).
Abiad et al (2008).
Extent of banking sector supervision 7-point scale of presence-absence coded conditions: country adoption of Basle capital adequacy ratio, independence of supervisory agency, presence of onsite examinations, and regulatory coverage of all financial institutions (0=Not Regulated, 6=Highly Regulated).

Financial reform index
Normalised sum of financial reform measures: credit controls, pro-competition measures, banking supervision, privatisation, international capital flows, and security markets (greater value=greater extent of reform).
Abiad et al (2008).
Top .1% income share Share of income accruing to top .1% of earners based on taxation data.
World Top Incomes
Database (see Appendix B). 
Power resources and the capital-labour bargain
Operational definitions, sources, and summary statistics for all variables are provided in tables 1 and 2. The first set of models assesses the impact of financialisation on top income shares, controlling both for institutional protections associated with mitigating inequality, and the extent of labour's power resources. These specifications draw in particular on the work of Kus (2012) who notes the positive impact of financialisation on personal income inequality net of bargaining controls such as unionisation, trade openness, and government spending. These parameters also attempt to capture a particular asymmetry in power resources linked to bargaining capacity identified by Piketty (2014) , which has underpinned the 'property space' of top earners incentives in financialised economies. Sectoral models of the impact of financialisation on senior compensation have confirmed this growing asymmetry, by noting strong top income growth linked to financialisation, coupled with a negative effect of unionisation Lin, 2013, p. 1308) . Consistent with existing studies which have modelled the impact of financialisation on the personal and factor distribution of income (Kus, 2012; Stockhammer, 2013; Volscho and Kelly, 2012) , we include trade union density from Visser's ICTWSS database (2013), government consumption as a percentage of GDP from the Penn World Table, and the KOF index of economic globalisation compiled from data on trade flows, and trade restrictions (Dreher, 2006) . This index combines economic integration measures of actual flows (i.e. foreign direct investment and income payments to foreign nationals), with measures of restrictions (i.e. import barriers and tariff rates). Eight measures are rescaled (0-100) to produce a composite index of economic globalisation (Dreher, Gaston and Martens, 2008) . Whilst this measure captures a wide range of economic integration factors, we also include a direct measure of domestic trade openness from the Penn World Table, calculated as the percentage of combined imports and exports over GDP. To these are added unemployment, and female labour force participation rates drawn from the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) statistics, as measures of cyclical economic downturn (Volscho and Kelly, 2012) , and changing labour market composition respectively. Economic growth performed weakly in all specifications and was therefore excluded, although all coefficients are robust to its inclusion. Furthermore, as these models deal largely with labour market-related variables, the effect of weak economic performance is likely to be registered through unemployment.
Drawing on literatures which theorise the channelling of financialisation through the workplace through intensive, equity-oriented HR practices (Thompson, 2003; Cushen and Thompson, 2013) , we include a measure of the market capitalisation of listed firms, in order to capture the effect of firm participation and diversification into financial activities. Given the suggested importance of credit in sustaining consumption under real wage stagnation, and the issue of rising productivity capture by capital highlighted by the International Labour Organization (2013), we include a measure of the volume of domestic credit issued by banks to the private sector as an indicator of the growing importance of credit.
In order to capture the importance of finance relative to other economic sectors, we include the gross operating surplus of Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate as a percentage of total sectoral gross operating surplus taken from the OECD's Structural Analysis database. While this is a preferable measure of financialisation since it captures the growing contribution of finance relative to other economic sectors (Krippner, 2011) , its coverage ranges from 1990 to 2008. Finally, we include the share of Gross National Income accruing to workers as compensation (labour's share), as a core measure of the bargaining power of labour relative to capital. Studies have shown the negative impact of labour's share on personal income inequality (Gini) , stressing the long-term importance of strong collective bargaining in sustaining greater rewards for labour, and a more equitable distribution of income (Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa, 2007; Stockhammer, 2013) . These studies offer strong justification for including labour's share as an intermediary between the determination of an economy-wide income pool, and the politics of its personal distribution (Atkinson, 2009) .
Financial regulation and redistribution
The second set of models examines the impact of financial regulation and redistributive capacity. These models address more pointedly the institutional structures underpinning asymmetric bargaining capacity, by testing the extent to which taxation and redistribute capacity may have augmented top income growth, by impacting the ability of top earners to realise higher income levels (Piketty 2014) . According to Piketty, relaxed top income taxation and wider financial regulation -theorised above as embedded in a specific historical regulatory logic -played a key role in spurring inter-actor wage competition since the 1980's. These models control for government consumption, union density, and economic globalisation, as well as market capitalisation as a base measure of domestic financialisation. We also include economic growth measured as the yearly percentage change in real GDP taken from the Penn World Table. This variable controls for periods of economic volatility, whilst testing for transfer effects linked to stronger economic performance (Kus, 2012; Volscho and Kelly, 2012) . Models include financial globalisation, measured as the log of external assets and liabilities over GDP (ILO, 2013; Stockhammer, 2013) in order to capture the dependence of domestic financialized profitability on international expansion (Christophers, 2012) . The data on financial globalisation are taken from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) , and their coverage extends from 1990-2004. In light of their limited coverage, inclusion of this variable is limited to the first model in order to capture its unique effect as a component of financialisation, and to maximise panel coverage for subsequent models.
In order to assess whether top income growth has proceeded independent of domestic taxation measures, and to assess the distributional consequences of different taxation streams, we include the extent of capital and indirect taxation as a percentage of the total tax take, sourced from the European Commission's Annual Macro-Economic Database (AMECO). This set of models also includes a measure of post-tax and transfer income inequality taken from Solt (2009) , in order to assess the relationship between underlying personal income inequality rates, and concentrations within upper percentiles. Given the greater redistributive capacities associated with more social democratic transfer systems, we should expect greater levels of personal income inequality across the personal distribution to influence top percentile accumulation (Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2010, p. 706) . To account for potential endogeneity, a re-specified model using the income share of the top .1% is available as an online supplement, although results in the GMM specification are similar in direction. The political basis of redistributive capacity is further emphasised by research showing how social expenditure, capital taxation rates, and top income growth are often dependent on partisan incumbency, and their disposition to greater or lesser degrees of regulation and social transfer (Castles and Obinger, 2007; Volscho and Kelly, 2012) . Finally, to assess the effect of financial sector regulation, we include measures of the extent of banking sector liberalisation, the extent of banking sector supervision, as well as a standardised index of financial sector reform, all taken from Abiad et al (2008) . Full details of their operational definitions and direction of scoring are provided in table 2. 
Results
Power resources and the capital-labour bargain
The labour market-bargaining context of inequality observed in existing studies thus appears to hold in relation to top incomes, in light of consistency in the magnitude and direction of controls across all specification. Institutional protections such as government consumption and unionisation compress top income accumulation, whilst trade openness and economic globalisation appear to benefit top incomes, consistent with studies of the impact of globalisation on capital shares which link increasing capital power to technologically-driven productivity capture, innovation in financial instruments, capital account openness and trade deregulation (Harrison 2005 , Jayadev 2005 ). Unemployment, which captures both cyclical economic downturns and the corresponding structural weakness of labour displays positive association with top incomes across all specifications. This is unsurprising given the comparative ease with which high earners are able to weather economic downturns through reliance on alternative 'unearned' income streams linked to financial instruments, an effect mirrored in later specifications which show positive effects linked to economic growth (Volscho and Kelly, 2012) . The accession of women to the labour force, a condition associated with accession to low-security, low-skill occupations (Kus, 2012 ) is also unstable across specifications and non-significant in the full bargaining model, suggesting these mechanisms may bear more relevance to the wider personal income distribution.
The progressive inclusion of different components of financialisation allows us to examine more clearly their effects, in tandem with underlying labour market conditions. The positive effect of finance-related variables supports our assertion that financialisation has driven top income growth through bargaining asymmetry, both by stifling real incomes through demand-sustaining debt servicing, and weakening bargaining capacity under decentralised industrial relations. In the literature, the growth of debt markets plays an important role as an additional channel for the enrichment of top earners through securitisation, aided by innovation in financial instruments linked to increasing firm involvement in financial markets. The effects of both market capitalisation and domestic credit volume are weak relative to stressors such as unemployment and economic globalisation however, with the latter non-significant. The weaker effect of debt is curious, considering that rising debt has been linked both to median income stagnation, and the substantial rise in publicly-traded debt servicing agencies which would suggest a stronger effect (Kus, 2013a) . This finding likely reflects Kus' analysis of the moderating effects of debt, which shored up consumption and moderated personal income inequality (Kus, 2013b) .
The mechanism of association between top incomes and market capitalisation is perhaps easier to establish, although its detected effect remains substantively small. As the 'disconnected capitalism' thesis is predicted on a divergence of corporate strategies toward share price and dividends, the corresponding delinking of executive pay from underlying performances indices likely underpins the strong growth of top managerial incomes relative to median wage earning (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013) . High-earning hedge fund managers now routinely earn over a billion dollars per year (the top 50 of whom are all male), whilst CEO earnings including salary bonus and stock option, have been rising since 2010, reaching an average of 10.5 million dollars in 2012 (Forbes, 2012) . This is despite rising OECD market income inequality, and increases of up to 8 percentage points in relative income inequality in countries such as Ireland since the onset of the financial crisis (OECD, 2014).
These discrete elements of the financialisation narrative, and their embedding within broader logics of economic action, may be better understood through a more fundamental indicatorthat of the relative importance of the financial sector. This variable forms a crucial context to the shifting power resources of economic actors, and its importance is evident in the consistent positive effect of FIRE sector operating surplus in our models. The outpacing of FIRE sector profits relative to other economic sectors reflects a fundamental shift in the generation of profits away from commodities and trade toward financial channels, a process which saw widespread dependence of non-financial industries on financial income streams as a profit subsidy (Krippner, 2005) . Whilst the scale of this shift in the structure of profit has long been recognised as a key indicator of the conceptual validity of financialisation, it also played a key role in reshaping power relations between interest groups within economic sectors. More general works on the distributional consequences of financial sector expansion particularly stress its effect on top-tier income capture, through the use of non-indexed performance bonuses and stock options (de Serres et al, 2002) . As reflected in sectoral-level work on top compensation, the relative weight of financial to business receipts hastened a 'decoupling' of surplus generation from production, enhancing executive compensation while excluding the wider workforce from wage-setting as resources were steadily reallocated away from core production Tomaskovic-Devy, 2013, p. 1294) . The consistency of our FIRE variable thus generalises this important structural precondition of bargaining asymmetry to the wider pool of advanced democracies.
The distributional consequences of the growing weight of the FIRE sector in economic life are further reflected in our findings concerning the effect of labour's share. Consistent with models of the relationship between the factor and personal income distribution, we find a greater share of labour in Gross National Income to be associated with a reduction in top income shares. Capital income growth has been explained with reference to the rise of growth strategies incorporating capital account deregulation (Jayadev, 2007) which are typically investmentoriented. As a result, greater shares of capital in national income have been associated with greater overall income inequality (Daudey and Garcia-Panalosa, 2007) . The above results suggest that this relationship holds net of underlying bargaining controls, and of the sectoral importance of finance. Furthermore, it strongly affirms Atkinson's (2009) suggestion of giving greater attention to the intermediary effects of factor shares as a meaningful moderator of the personal income distribution. The balance of labour's share appears to matter not only as a definitional measure of the setting of an economy-wide income pool as per Atkinson, but also as a measure of the capacity of labour to effect greater income capture. All specifications thus point toward a strong asymmetry in bargaining capacity reflected both in the explanatory and conceptual literatures on finance-driven inequality. 
Financial regulation and redistribution
The second set of models retains relevant controls from the power resources specification, namely government consumption, unionisation, and economic globalisation, in order to include institutional power resources as a context for formal regulation. To these are added economic growth, both as a test of transfer effects linked to stronger economic performance (Volscho and Kely, 2012) , and as a precondition of state redistributive capacity linked to fiscal policy, which is likely to be responsive to underlying economic performance. As financial market engagement provides a theoretical link between the power resources of top earners vis-à-vis formal regulatory regimes, its consistency across both specifications net of underlying controls is noteworthy. Similar to Stockhammer (2013) , we find a particularly strong effect for financial globalisation net of other controls. Given that the general weakening of median income associated with globalisation is a standard condition of bargaining models of income distribution, it is unsurprising that this should also profoundly influence top incomes. This component of the globalisation of finance may also be linked theoretically to the mechanism elaborated for market capitalisation, where the outward focus of firms and inter-trading of financial instruments forms an integral component of the equity-oriented regime of corporate governance. Instrument innovation also plays a central role in Piketty's model of divergent economic growth and capital returns as a driver of wealth concentration, where the diversity of capital gains sources outstrips regulatory capacity. Together, both market capitalisation and financial globalisation have been associated with growing capital mobility, and a diversification of within-firm income streams, both of which appear to substantially augment the share of the top 1%. In a broader sense, financial globalisation should also capture the 'leveraging' effects of global finance. This has consistently been identified as a factor which raised the pre-crisis exposure of national polities to volatile financial markets, whilst also increasing the global scale of profiteering, as securitisation and deregulation both conspired to erode the domestic limits of financial activity (Guttman, 2008; Tabb, 2010) .
Specification two confirms something of the relationship between different components of the overall income distribution identified in our original bargaining models. Both the factor and personal distribution of income appear to track closely the shares of the top 1%, with greater post-tax and transfer personal income inequality associated with higher shares of income for the top 1%. Together, these measures construct a clearer overall picture of the interrelationship between different aspects of the income distribution and top income capture, where the rise of the rich appears closely connected both to their volume of capital share in GNI, and weaker state redistributive capacity (personal income inequality). Higher capital taxes are predictably associated with lower top income shares, reflecting the likely dependence of this cohort on interest-bearing income. The effect of higher capital taxation may work either by conditioning of investor behaviour toward greater consumption, or by direct redistribution through social transfers (Volscho and Kelly, 2012, p. 694) . The negative direction of indirect taxation is curious, considering greater reliance on consumption taxes is typically associated with regressive effects on inequality, where poorer households often bear the brunt of such increases. Although the distributive effect of various taxation streams depends on underlying consumption habits, luxury goods comprise a small proportion of the overall indirect taxation take, with the majority of consumption taxes levied on general goods (Bermandi and Rueda, 2007) . Although results point strongly toward the efficacy of capital taxation and state distributive capacity as factors mitigating top income capture, further investigation is clearly needed into the composition of the tax take in terms of the spread and general cost of goods and services included.
Banking sector liberalisation, banking sector supervision, and financial reform are all associated with growth in top income shares. The finding that all should contribute to top income growth is explicable in terms of the content of the measures, and of the general logic of financial sector liberalisation and supervision which accompanied financialisation in advanced democracies. Firstly, our banking sector variable is likely capturing the emergent effects of firm-level liberalisation, whereby restrictions on foreign competition in the banking sector, and on the range of permissible activities of banks was substantially relaxed over the timespan of our models. This formed an important precondition of the financial crisis, whereby the commercial banking sector sought to diversify its income streams in a competitive global market through greater reliance on leveraged financial instruments (Ó Riain, 2014, p. 143) . This expansion was both facilitated and underpinned by a specific logic of 'light-touch' regulation which was embedded throughout the OECD through policy measures such as the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in the U.S. (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devy, 2013) , global implementation of revisions to the Basel Accord (Guttman and Plihon, 2008) , and the harmonisation of fiscal rules and monetary policy under the provisions of the European Monetary Union (conditions captured broadly by our latter two variables). These institutional diversifications and policy measures have been shown not only to increase the volume of exposure of the financial system to high-yield capital markets, but also to drive welfare state retrenchment and weaken domestic labour movements, thus driving income inequality higher (Beckfield, 2006 (Beckfield, , 2009 . In the post-crisis years it has also become clear that the pace of supervision and financial reform were insufficient to keep up with the growing complexity of financial instruments. This combination of banking liberalisation and weak governance thus appears to have sustained a potent mechanism for top income gains by substantially enhancing the scope of rentier income streams, which form a key element in the income composition of top fractiles (Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2013, p. 12) .
Further empirical indication is thus given to the process of disembedding described by Jessop (2013) , where the institutional fixes of post-Fordist accumulation are predicted on political measures geared toward loosening constraints on financial capital. These measures have a clear political history through policies such as the Basel accord, which triggered widespread use of securitisation by financial institutions in an attempt to circumvent its capital adequacy conditions (Guttman, 2008) . Coupled with the recorded weakening in labour's share (Kristal, 2010) and growth in personal income inequality particularly since the financial crisis (OECD, 2014), the above results underline a class-based bargaining model of accumulation, where the political control of capital and its regulation has generated uneven advantage with a clear class gradient (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013 ). Whilst our coefficients on taxation, redistributive capacity, and financial globalisation affirm the role of income-related social policy in tandem with financialisation, there is clearly a broader politics of distribution at work, as revealed by the consistent direction and magnitude of institutional protections and stressors in all specifications. The political basis of redistributive capacity is further emphasised by research showing how social expenditure, capital taxation rates, and top income growth are often dependent on partisan incumbency, and their disposition to greater or lesser degrees of regulation and social transfer (Castles and Obinger, 2007; Volscho and Kelly, 2012) .
Conclusion
This analysis contributes two fundamental points to the financialisation debate in particular, and to Piketty's thesis in general. First, given the general responsiveness of top incomes to measures of power resources linked to financialisation, our results suggest that wealth concentration must be interpreted in terms of relative class-based and institutional power resources. Second, these results offer a wider theoretical contribution, insofar as they reassert the necessity of conceptualising social change in terms of distinct regulatory regimes -financialisation being the most recent. While the preceding results must be cautiously interpreted owing to sample limitations, they beg important questions concerning prognosis, as wider trends suggest the era of financialisation to be one of the worst in terms of its capacity to enhance inequality. Our evidence shows that bargaining asymmetry is driven by a variety of factors beyond fiscal policy alone, such as regulatory control, class-based power resources, financial globalisation and institutional weakening. Whilst the weight of financial sector profit and productivity has continued its upward climb relative to other economic sectors, in many countries -including social democracies such as Denmark for example -it continues to outstrip the real economy in terms of its contribution to productivity and growth. In light of this complexity, serious questions must be asked about the ability of capital taxation measures alone to effect redistribution in the absence of a broader reconfiguration of social relations linked to the distribution of economic reward (Piketty, 2014) .
In light of our findings that FIRE sector surplus constitutes a key predictor of top income growth, and its noted role as a contributor to re-shaping the field of bargaining between capital and labour, our findings must surely raise questions concerning the ability of a fragmented labour movement, particularly in liberal market economies, to effect meaningful equality of outcome in an economy yet beholden to elite-dominated finance. This effect is especially concerning since it captures a fundamental shift not only in the organisation of capitalist economies, but of the social relations under which the struggle for capitalism's rewards takes place. Recent history has shown that the shift toward finance has merely offered a tentative basis for growth, volatility for labour, yet according to our results, a reckonable channel for the resource-endowed to augment their fortunes. This analysis further underscores the importance of exploring income in terms of its factor and personal distributions, where inequality is driven both by greater capture of national product by capital relative to labour, and by a 'hollowing out' of protections associated with greater redistribution. Questions of class-biased power resources rest at the heart of these inequalities, such as control over the setting of fiscal and social policy, allocation of the burden of post-crisis austerity, and a deference on the part of stricken governments to financial markets in their recovery strategies.
If we are to accept the prognosis following from Piketty's 'empirical proof' of the centrality of inequality to a functioning capitalism, the consequences of continued top income growth are likely to be dire. Harvey (2013) arrives at much the same conclusion in his diagnosis of the principal contradictions of capitalism, where he singles out the unsustainability of compound growth in a system dependent on exponential returns. Worse still, the post-war asset devaluations identified by Piketty as a principal shock to the fortunes of the wealthy have apparently done little to alter the concentration of income in the crisis of our time. Instead, the devaluation of 2008 estimated by the IMF at one year's worth of global output, offered but brief pause as property and interest-bearing assets remained largely in the hands of the wealthy (Harvey, 2013, p. 234) . It is therefore ironic that the recent financial crisis has favourably exposed the 'apparatus of exploitation' embedded in capitalism's latest 'phase transition', lending credence to public debate for redistributive measures such as wealth taxation (Moreno, 2014, p. 265) . Caution is required in generalising these results however. Whilst our choice of data was driven by the need to strike a balance between eligible countries from the World Top Incomes Database with relevant financialisation indicators, our conclusions are thus limited primarily to 'advanced capitalist democracies' (Kristal, 2010) . However, many of our results are corroborated by other decomposed models which have examined advanced countries (Stockhammer, 2013) , where financialisation has proven a greater boon to capital shares than globalisation, technological change, and welfare state retrenchment.
Our results point toward the rising structural weakness of labour in the face of stressors such as the globalisation of capital, the erosion of redistributive measures such as collective bargaining capacity, strong labour unions, and financial regulation as key culprits in rising wealth inequality. Financialisation is implicated heavily in these dynamics, not only as a principal agent in the shifting balance of power toward capital, but as a force in the erosion of regulatory control, as growth capacity in the developed world shifted from the real economy toward disembedded financial activity. Prescriptively, these results suggest that greater shares of state consumption, healthy labour movements, tighter regulation and stronger redistributive capacity are central to mitigating the effects of top income accumulation associated with financialisation. Further, we find strong evidence that this accumulation has been driven by familiar components of the financialisation narrative linked to a market-driven 'disconnect' between real growth performance and top compensation, and a side-lining of labour's interests (Stockhammer, 2012; Thompson, 2013) .
Although the preceding results identify a common stressor of equality in the form of financial globalisation, comparative research suggests that future work may benefit from considering variation in the impact of financialisation across different 'worlds of capitalism'. Denmark's postcrisis use of collective private funds for distressed banks for example, contrasts starkly with Ireland's sector-wide deposit and liability guarantee scheme, illustrating the potential importance of cross-regime difference between liberal and social democratic political economies (Grossman and Woll, 2014) . In the Irish case, the post-crisis response further entrenched inequalities between income groups by reducing the liabilities of investors, whilst redressing the fiscal balance through a wave of austerity policies, targeting public investment and welfare. This is but one example of the potential nuances which may be overlooked by an analysis at this level of abstraction. In terms of broader theory, our models suggest that a 'social structures of accumulation' approach, albeit one augmented to focus on the impact of class-biased power resources on inequality, is a productive line of inquiry. As evidence accumulates on the importance of the distribution of bargaining power between capital and labour, it is important that inequality research pays greater attention to how this bargaining power filters through regulatory orders, producing stronger concentrations of economic power and income capture.
Appendix A: Unit root diagnostics
The following The tax unit since 1953 is the individual, and the control is the number of people aged 15 and over. The income total is pre-tax gross income, and the control total is derived from adjusted national accounts household income totals, including transfers. Realised capital gains are excluded, whist dividends are covered by the estimates. An increase of the marginal tax rate on incomes over $60,000 from 33% to 39% in 2000, led to extensive realisation of business earnings in 1999, whilst a fully separate system of capital gains returns was established during the same tax year (Atkinson and Leigh 2007b, p. 339 Decennial census' are used to calculate control population totals through interpolation, and the control income total is the total of tax returned income with adjustment for nonreturners. This total income is defined as personal income including transfers, and after-tax corporate profits after distribution of dividends. Switzerland maintains a very low top marginal income tax rate (10%); there is no federal inheritance or estate tax, and most counties do not levy inheritance taxes between spouses, parents, or children. Thus the marginal tax rate on local and capital income has been very low relative to OECD comparators. Complete tax avoision is difficult however, as returns on wealth invested are flat-taxed 35% at source. Whilst the use of flat-rate allows for a level of secrecy around account ownership, it allows for estimates of the proportion of non-Swiss filing income tax returns (Dell, Piketty, and Saez 2007) .
Top 1% income share United Kingdom U.K. tax base figures do not correspond with definite income definition, and thus omit most capital gains and losses (note that there is a time effect here which lends some confidence to the consistency of figures within the timeframe under consideration within this study -whilst the effect of capital gains and losses over time cannot be assumed uniform as verified by the U.S. case, incentives for tax avoidance fall within changes to policy, which tend to be less frequent). Units for top income estimates are individuals, and the control total for income is the total from income tax statistics with an added estimate of the income of units not covered. In 1997, the share of investment income of the top 1% was approximately 12% (Atkinson 2007, p. 110) .
Top 1% income share adults United States
Tax unit is the married couple or single adult with dependents. Calculations use a gross income definition which includes all income items on tax returns before deduction (salaries and wages, farm income, dividends, interest, rents). Realised capital gains are not an annual flow of income and form a volatile component of income with large variations dependent on stock prices, thus the preferred series for comparability is the series with excluded capital gains (Piketty and Saez 2007, p. 144 and p. 195 
